Various digital watermarking techniques have been proposed in recent years as methods to protect the copyright of multimedia data. However, as pointed out by the IBM research group, the rightful ownership problem has not been properly solved. Currently, there are two proposals to solve the ownership problem. Unfortunately, one proposal lacks a formal proof and the other can be easily defeated. In addition, because the purpose of watermark is mainly for protecting the original owner's rights, the rights of legitimate customers have not been addressed. This could eventually defeat the goal of using watermark to protect the owner's copyright.
INTRODUCTION
With the growth of multimedia systems in distributed environments, the problems associated with multimedia security and multimedia copyright protection have become important issues. Digital watermarking techniques have been proposed in recent years as methods to protect the copyright of multimedia data. There are various watermarking schemes applied to images and several methods applied to audio and video streams. Among them, a large class of the watermarking schemes addresses invisible watermarks. The research and scheme design mainly focus on the issues such as Perceptual E ects { the watermark should be invisible and the distortion should be minimized; Robust Design { the watermark must be di cult to remove and immune to multimedia data operations such as digital-to-analog and analog-to-digital conversion, requantization, dithering, resampling, rotation, scaling, cropping, etc. The watermark schemes should also be robust against multiple-document attacks.
However, there are still open problems. One of them, as pointed out by Craver et al from IBM 12] , is how to resolve the rightful ownership of the invisible watermarking schemes. Craver et al attacked existing watermarking techniques by providing counterfeit watermarking schemes that can be performed on a watermarked image to allow multiple claims of ownerships. We refer to their attack as the IBM attack. The rightful ownership problem is either not addressed at all or not addressed properly within current existing watermarking techniques. Furthermore, the IBM group de ned the concept of non-invertibility. Informally, non-invertibility means that it is computationally impossible for an attacker to nd a pair of a faked image and a watermark such that the pair can result in the same watermarked image created by the real owner. The IBM group also tried to design a non-invertible scheme which is a modi ed version of the watermarking method proposed by Cox et al. Unfortunately, their scheme cannot be proven to be non-invertible.
Another open problem refers to the customer's right protection. The rights of the legitimate customers/buyers when using watermark have not been addressed at all. Currently, owners/sellers of video/image information have complete control of the watermarking procedure, and customers have to accept the transaction from the owners (sellers) without any certi cate to prove their rights to use the watermarked data. Without solving this problem, the use of watermarked data is limited especially in the Internet environment. More seriously, without addressing this problem properly, the goal of using watermarks to protect the owner's copyright could eventually be defeated.
In this paper, we present solutions to both problems described above:
1 ) We present watermarking methods which resolve the rightful ownership and are successful against the IBM attack. We introduce requirements on the watermark construction algorithm which include (1) using a standard encryption function such as DES 21] , and (2) using the original image/video or other known bit stream information during the construction process. Because of these requirements, the non-invertibility of our proposed scheme is easily proved. Although our methods are mainly applied to MPEG-encoded video streams, they can be easily extended to many image schemes or other video schemes. We apply our scheme to raw images and prove its non-invertibility property. 2 ) We present two protocols to provide protection of customers' rights. We introduce a certicate/identi cation information for the customer. The customer's certi cate needs to be tied into the watermarking process at the owner's side. Only the customer knows the key which creates the certi cate. Once the customer purchases the watermarked data, he/she can prove his/her rights by showing that the certi cate is indeed created by his/her private key. The secure exchange of the certi cate and watermarked data is performed by our protocols.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 presents the relevant related work in the area of multimedia watermarking and in the area of general security protocols, authentication schemes, formal logic and principles, etc. The rst part provides an overview of multimedia watermarking. The second part serves as the background for the design and implementation of the customer's right protection protocols. Section 3 discusses the non-invertibility property of watermarking schemes, implications of not using the original image/video information in their veri cation process, as well as the IBM attack and known attempts against it. In Section 4, we describe our watermarking scheme on MPEG encoded video with the construction algorithm of the watermark. We prove that the proposed scheme is non-invertible and discuss in depth the requirements of the watermark construction and issues related to the scheme. In addition, we present another non-invertible scheme, which is applied to uncompressed image/video, and prove its non-invertibility. In Section 5, we discuss the usage of di erent non-invertible schemes. Section 6 explains by examples the problems which could arise without considering protection of customers' rights. In Section 7, we present our Customer's Right Protocols between owners and customers. We discuss two possible protocols to solve this problem. Section 8 discusses various aspects of the protocols. Section 9 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we present the related work in the area of multimedia watermarking and in the area of security protocols and authentication schemes. The general watermarking algorithms and watermark construction schemes provide the background to understand and solve the problems of rightful ownership and protection of customer's rights. The general security protocols, authentication, key distribution, non-repudiation protocols, and the general cryptographic protocol logics are important in solving the problem of customer's right protection.
Related Work on Watermarking Schemes
During the past few years, a number of digital watermarking methods have been proposed. Among the earliest works, L.F. Turner 30] proposed a digital audio watermarking method which substitutes the least signi cant bits of randomly selected audio samples with the bits of an identi cation string (watermark). A similar idea can also be applied to images 31]. However, because of the use of least signi cant bits, the identi cation code can be easily destroyed. There are many other proposals for watermarking such as Tanaka's schemes 29] which use the fact that the quantization noise is typically imperceptible to users, Brassil's methods 7] for textual document images, and Caronni's geometric patterns (also called tags) 9]. These schemes are easily defeated by ltering, redigitization, geometric distortion, cropping, requantization, etc.
Bender, Gruhl, and Morimoto 5] discuss two di erent approaches to watermarking: (1) Patchwork, and (2) Texture Block Coding. Patchwork is a statistical approach. It randomly chooses a pair of image points (a i , b i ), then increases the brightness of a i by one and decreases the brightness of b i by one. These two steps are repeated n times. The expected value of the sum of the di erence of such n pairs is then 2n. This method is resistant to compression and FIR lters and remarkably resistant to cropping. However, its assumption that all brightness levels are equally likely is not practical. Texture Block Coding is a visual approach. It hides data in continuous i random texture patterns. The texture blocking scheme is implemented by copying a region from a random texture pattern found in a picture to an area which has a similar texture. The auto-correlation of the image results in the recovery of the shape of the region. This method is limited to those images with a lot of textures.
Smith and Comiskey 24] discuss the characteristics of the data hiding schemes, such as the amount of information that can be hidden, the perceptibility, the robustness which is modeled using the quantities of channel, the signal-to-noise ratio, and the jamming margin. They introduce new data hiding schemes whose parameters can be adjusted with the capacity, imperceptibility, and robustness.
Koch, Rindfrey, and Zhao 13] present an image watermarking method. The image is grouped into 8x8 blocks and each 8x8 block is DCT transformed. They randomly choose a subset of those blocks, and for each block in that subset, one of the 18 possible triples of frequencies is selected and modi ed so that their relative strengths encode as 0 or 1. However, because the choice of the frequency set is not based on any perceptual signi cance and the variance of the frequency coe cients is small, this method may be sensitive to noise or distortions. It is also vulnerable to multiple-document attacks a .
Cox, Kilian, Leighton, and Shamoon 11] argue that a watermark must be placed in perceptually signi cant components of a signal if it is to be robust to common signal distortions and attacks. To avoid the perceptual degradation because of watermarking those components, they propose to insert a watermark into the spectral components of the data using techniques analogous to spread spectrum communications, hiding a narrow-band signal in a wide-band. The watermark consists of 1000 randomly generated numbers. The length of the watermark is variable and can be adjusted to suit the characteristics of the data.
Schneider and Chang 23] present a methodology for designing content based digital signatures which can be used to authenticate images. Using their methodology, signature systems can be designed which allow certain types of image modi cation but prevent other types from manipulation. They also propose an extension of the authentication system towards video.
Langelaar et al 15] propose two image watermarking methods. The rst one extends the existing spatial labeling technique which adds a positive integer constant k to the brightness of 50% of the pixels in an image. This constant k is called the label embedding level. By dividing the image into blocks and searching an optimal label-embedding level k for each block instead of using a xed embedding level, a large and more robust label can be embedded in an image. The second method removes high frequency DCT-coe cients in some areas to embed a label. However, this method may remove too many DCT-coe cients therefore cause distortions.
Hartung and Girod 18] provide a watermarking scheme speci cally for MPEG encoded video. The basic idea is to apply DCT to each of 8x8 blocks of the watermark and then add the DCT coe cients of the watermark to the corresponding DCT coe cients of MPEG stream. However, if the length of the new Hu man codeword is longer than the old one, then the algorithm restores the old DCT coe cient of the MPEG stream. This method guarantees that the length of watermarked video stream does not increase. The problem is that it may violate the requirement of labeling most signi cant components. The watermark embedding process is also slow. It can only handle data at Craver, Memon, Yeo, and Yeung 12] from IBM address an important issue of rightful ownership. They provide counterfeit watermarking schemes that can be performed on a watermarked image to allow multiple claims of rightful ownerships. We will refer to this attack as the IBM attack. We will discuss this topic in detail in the next section.
We need to point out that all of the schemes discussed in this section can not sustain the IBM attack therefore fail to resolve the rightful ownership.
Related Work on General Security Issues
Until now, watermarking schemes involved only the owner of the video/image information. The owner had complete control of the watermark construction, insertion of watermark into video/image, and its veri cation. However, in order to provide proper protection to customers/buyers who purchase the video/image, the watermarking framework needs protocols which involve owners, customers, and possibly a Trusted Third Party. These protocols require that all involved parties are authenticated properly, all messages are transmitted securely, and all evidence can not be repudiated. Below, we consider currently available techniques in these areas.
In Reiter and Stubblebine 22] discussed the concept of authentication metrics, a procedure for evaluating the assurance one has in a name-to-key binding. They developed a number of principles for the design of authentication metrics, demonstrated why several proposed metrics fall short, and described a new metric that comes close to being an acceptable metric of authentication.
Franklin and Reiter 14] provided a fair exchange protocol which enables two parties to exchange secrets with fairness so that neither of the parties can gain an information advantage by quitting prematurely or otherwise misbehaving. A \semi-trusted" third party is used to facilitate the exchange. Asokan, Schunter, and Waidner 2] presented optimistic protocols for fair exchange of electronic data with non-repudiation. These protocols do not involve a third party during a faultless exchange but do require one during their recovery. Zhou and Gollmann 33] also presented a fair non-repudiation protocol which requires a Trusted Third Party but the involvement of the Trusted Third Party is minimized. Gong 16] developed techniques which construct authentication protocols on the basis of one-way functions rather than encryption algorithms. Equally simple and capable protocols were achieved in comparison with either public-key or private-key encryption algorithms.
Bellare et al 3] proposed a family of protocols -iKP -for secure electronic payments over the Internet. The protocols involve three parties: the customer who makes the payment, the merchant who receives the payment, and a gateway which connects the electronic world with the existing payment infrastructure and authorizes the transactions. All iKP protocols are based on public-key cryptography and o er di erent levels of security. Cox, Tygar and Sirbu 10] presented Netbill security and transaction protocol. The features of the protocol include: (1) an atomic certi ed delivery method so that a customer pays if and only if he/she receives his/her information goods intact; (2) outsourcing access control { di erent users can use di erent access control servers; (3) a credential mechanism allowing users to prove membership in groups; (4) a structure for constructing pseudonyms to protect the identities of consumers.
Currently, to the authors' knowledge, there is no e ort to even identify the customer's right problem when using watermarked multimedia data.
RIGHTFUL OWNERSHIP PROBLEM
The purpose of a watermark is to protect the owner's copyright. But without a careful scheme design and proper requirements on the watermark, an attacker can easily confuse everyone by manipulating the watermarked video (image, audio) and claim that he/she also is the original owner. This is called the \rightful ownership" problem.
Craver et al provided the following scenario: given a watermarked video (image), it is possible for an attacker to watermark the watermarked video (image) again using any watermarking scheme. This twice watermarked video (image) has both original and attacker's watermarks on it. Both the original owner and the attacker can claim the ownership, therefore, defeat the purpose of using watermark.
Using the original video clip (image) in the veri cation process can prevent the multiple ownership problems in some cases. However, even with the presence of the original video clip (image), the rightful ownership problem still exists. Craver et al showed that the following scenario is possible:
Assume that the original video clip (image) is V. De nition 1 comes from the Craver's paper 12]. However, the requirement of E(V F ; W F ) = V W is too restrictive (too strong) on the invertibility because V W could be altered due to the noise and even the original V and W may not satisfy E(V; W) = V W in the veri cation process. On the other hand, the requirement of E(V F ; W F ) = V W is too loose (too weak) on the non-invertibility. We replace this requirement with E(V F is the i-th bit of the watermark. It is believed (although it has not been proved) that this scheme is secure against any trial and error type of attacks that an attacker can attempt in order to construct a falsi ed original.
There is a very important assumption (regulation) in the above algorithm which is: w i must be positive. In general, we need to enforce that the construction of any watermark has to follow certain rules. Otherwise, the ownership problem can not be solved. Craver et al gave one such an example which shows that if w i could also be negative in the above scheme, then the scheme is invertible. Here we show the importance of the watermark construction requirements by another example which is an extreme case. There is a class of invisible watermarking schemes which do not use original image (video clips) in the veri cation process. We will refer to these schemes as the Self-Proof Class. Because the use of the Self-Proof Class is simpler than that of other watermarking schemes, it is interesting to study its non-invertibility. We want to know \Are there any non-invertible schemes which belong to the Self-Proof Class?". Unfortunately, the answer is NO. THEOREM 1 The Self-Proof Class is inherently invertible.
PROOF:
Let (E; D; C) be a scheme from the Self-Proof Class. Because this scheme uses only the watermarked image (video clip) V W in the veri cation process, there is no way to verify how the watermark is created and how the original image(video clip) looks like. Because there is no restriction on the structure of the watermark and the original, any kind of watermarks and originals are legitimate. Therefore, an attacker can always use EXAMPLE 1 described above to make his/her ownership claim. This means any scheme of Self-Proof Class is invertible. 2
Of course, one can add a requirement to the watermark construction in the Self-Proof Class schemes. But in order to verify the watermark construction, something other than the water-marked image must be presented. This contradicts the concept and the de nition of the Self-Proof Class scheme which requires only the watermarked image during the veri cation process.
Another attempt to resolve the ownership problem is provided by Wolfgang and Delp 32] . Their method uses timestamps to generate the watermark. The owner with the earliest timestamp is the true owner. However, this scheme can be easily defeated because timestamps can be manipulated. For example, the time of an event, such as \the Berlin Wall came down", is well-known. If an attacker uses that time as his/her timestamp in watermarking the video/image taken during that event, then who is the original owner? Another case can occur when the real time clock is displayed somewhere in the picture, such as in the videos of news broadcasting, basketball games, etc. In these cases, the timestamps can be accurately determined by attackers according to the real clock. Again, if an attacker uses these timestamps, then who is the original owner? Based on the above discussion, we conclude that the use of timestamp is not a good way to solve the watermark ownership problem.
NON-INVERTIBLE WATERMARKING SCHEMES
One possible approach against IBM attack is to make a strict requirement on the construction of the watermark and bind the watermark to the original video/image itself or some publicly known number sequence such as . This will greatly limit the choices for the watermark W F and falsi ed \original" V F of an attacker. Clearly, if it is computationally impossible for an attacker to nd both W F and V F which satisfy formula (2), then the non-invertibility is achieved. In this section, we will rst derive such a scheme which applies to the MPEG-encoded video streams and then derive another one for raw image or uncompressed video stream. We will prove the non-invertibilities of both schemes.
MPEG Based Non-Invertible Watermarking Scheme
In this subsection, we will refer to V as a single I frame within the I, P, B sequence of a MPEG stream.
Construction of Watermark
We concentrate on the description of the watermark construction applied to a single image V encoded in JPEG format. This description can be easily extended to the I frames of MPEG video clips. Our method utilizes ideas from direct sequence spread spectrum communications. The watermark construction algorithm consists of several steps:
First, we choose a standard encryption function, such as DES, and a key KEY . In Zig-Zag order, we scan each block of the DCT-transformed image. Second, we transform the rst m (1 m nb) nAC l into binary numbers and concatenate those binary numbers to form a PAD, i.e., PAD = nAC 1 :::nAC m . The choice of m will depend on the number of bits which can be embedded into the frame V . For example, for a standard MPEG-1 video with picture size 352x288 (pixels), there are a total of 1584 blocks. Therefore, 11 bits are required to represent each nAC l because 2 10 = 1024 < 1584 < 2048 = 2 11 . If we are allowed to embed a total of 101 bits, m will be d101=11e = 10.
Third, we apply DES with KEY to PAD and get EPAD = DES KEY (PAD). Forth, let us consider de nitions of the following bit sequences: -Let A j be a bit sequence, where j=1 ... total number of bits allowed to embedded in V , such that
-Let B i be a bit sequence, such that B i = A j ; (j C r ) i < ((j + 1) C r ) (6) where C r is the chip-rate. 
Last, we construct the watermark bit sequence by combining the sequences B i and p i : w i = B i p i ; i = 1 ... (Width x Height) (8) We will discuss how we select the scaling number in Subsection 4.1.2.
The Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the whole watermark construction process. It is applied to the standard MPEG-1 frame with a size of 352(Width)x288(Height) pixels.
Watermarking Procedure
There are several assumptions and requirements which need to be mentioned before we describe our scheme.
A1 We derive a watermarking scheme for MPEG-compressed video without fully decoding the video to raw image sequence and again encoding. We decode the video up to the DCT coe cients and then embed a watermark into the stream at the DC and AC coe cient level. 
A2
We set = 1. Tests on various MPEG clips show that, with chip-rate 1000, if we watermark the DC coe cients, then the watermarked video has a lower quality and the watermark is visible (see Figure 2) . One way to solve this problem is to increase the chip-rate, for example, to 5000. This, however, will decrease the amount of information that can be embedded by a factor of 5. Therefore, such an approach is not a good solution. We choose not to mark any DC coe cients. (Setting to a small number can also avoid the quality degradation, but this means that there are many choices for in one scheme and di erent can be chosen in di erent schemes. This uncertainty gives an attacker freedom to manipulate the veri cation process. Therefore, we x = 1.) A3 We only watermark I frames since they are the most signi cant frames in a video stream. The watermark of I frames will be carried over to P and B frames due to the dependency between I, P, and B frames. It is true that an attacker could drop all watermarked I frames to get an unwatermarked video stream. However, although P and B frames may contain some I-blocks which can be decoded by themselves, there is enough dependency between the I frame and the P and B frames, therefore, the quality of the P or B frames will be bad enough if the I frames are dropped. A4 We want to achieve that the total length of a watermarked stream is less than or equal to the total length of the original stream, so that the watermarking process does not defeat the compressing process of MPEG. A5 In our scheme, the original video stream and a key are needed for both the watermark creation and the veri cation process. This is justi ed by THEOREM 1.
With the above assumptions and requirements, we design an algorithm as shown in Figure 3 called ALGORITHM 1.
The main steps of ALGORITHM 1 are: M1 A new watermark is created based on the encrypting information from the original I frame V ; We denote the process as w i = DES KEY (v i ). We then put the sequence w i into a two dimensional matrix of (Height x Width). The result is a watermark in the form of a raw image. M2 DCT is applied to the watermark; M3 An AC coe cient in the original image V is marked if the length of the resulting VLC (Variable Length Code) does not increase. M4 An AC coe cient is marked and the last non-zero AC coe cient (in the zig-zag order) of a block in the original image V is dropped if the total length of the resulting VLC does not increase. No more than two AC's can be dropped within a block. d
We now discuss the results and the implications of the proposed scheme.
R1 Formula (nAC l in V W ) < (nAC l in V ) always holds. This is because, for each block, there are three possible outcomes: the number of non-zero AC's decreases by 0 (unchanged), 1, or 2 in comparison with the original video frame V . nAC l in V W depends only on the original V and KEY . It is easy to see that the total number of non-zero AC coe cients in V W decreases. In addition, the values of some non-zero AC coe cients in V W can also be changed. Such changes also depend only on V and KEY .
d Two AC's can be dropped only when one becomes 0 and another, which must be the last non-zero AC coe cient, is dropped.
Let nAC l denote the number of l-th AC coe cients in zigzag order in the I frame, where l = 1, . p i in the spread spectrum scheme is the Pseudo Random Noise Code. By applying DES to V , we can create a Pseudo Random sequence of values 1/-1 which can be used as p i . By choosing a di erent KEY , a di erent p i sequence is created. The KEY is safe due to the DES encryption algorithm which means that it is computationally impossible for an attacker to nd out the key even with the knowledge of V . R3 The information contained in PAD is essentially the number of rst m non-zero AC coe cients in the frame V . This information is unknown without the knowledge of the original V .
Veri cation Process
The veri cation process justi es the ownership claim and consists of three steps:
J1 The claimant is required to provide his/her original video clip V , the key KEY , and his/her watermark W. Then the trusted third party veri es the creation of the watermark. If the watermark is con rmed, then
Step J2 is applied. Otherwise, the ownership is denied to the claimant. J2 The trusted third party applies ALGORITHM 1 described in Figure 3 . Let the resulting watermarked video/image be V v . As the next step, apply Step J3. 
Proof of Non-Invertibility
In this section, we will show that the watermarking algorithm presented in Section 4.1.2 together with the suggested watermark construction presented in Section 4.1.1 form a non-invertible watermarking scheme.
THEOREM 2 ALGORITHM 1 is non-invertible.
PROOF:
We need to analyze two major steps in the scheme: a) watermarking process and b) watermark generation.
a) The watermarking process in our scheme is xed and the result depends exclusively on the original I frame V and the watermark W. If the watermark W is generated by DES as described in Section 4.1.1, then W is a random bit sequence. Obviously, applying our scheme to two di erent random bit sequences will result in two di erent watermarked video frames V 1 and V 2, such that C(V 1; V 2; ) 6 = 1. b) Clearly, the attacker can choose a bit sequence, i.e. choose a watermark, such that resulting V1 and V2 satisfy C(V 1; V 2; ) = 1. But from R2. and R3. above, we can see that the watermark in our scheme is xed and depends only on the original I frame V and the key KEY . Because the attacker has to show that his watermark is the result of applying DES to his original, he/she has to nd the key based on his/her chosen watermark. This is equivalent to \given ciphertext, nd the plain-text and the key" or to break DES e which is impossible.
In summary, we can conclude that ALGORITHM 1 is non-invertible. 2
From the second half of the proof above, we can see that, given a watermark, it is impossible to nd the corresponding original because this is also equivalent to \given ciphertext, nd the plain-text and the key" or to break DES. Therefore, we have the following:
COROLLARY 1 If the original video/image is known but the key is unknown, it is still impossible for anyone to create the same watermarked video clips (image) using ALGORITHM 1.
Discussion
COROLLARY 1 implies that the construction of the watermark plays an essential role in our scheme to solve the rightful ownership problem. By using the encryption function as a \black-box", the watermark can not be arbitrarily chosen by an attacker. Therefore, checking the watermark construction is needed during the watermark veri cation process. COROLLARY 1 seems to indicate that the original video/image information is not needed. But this is not true. Without the original, we can not verify if a watermark is a legitimate one. However, the \original" does not have to be a true image or part of the video clip. It could be some publicly known number sequence. For example, we can use rst 100000 digits of as the \original" for generating the watermark. In this case, the creation of p i in ALGORITHM 1 should be modi ed as p i = ?1 if i-th bit of DES KEY ( ) is 0, 1 otherwise.
We also notice that EPAD is actually redundant in the watermark creation process. We can simplify the process and use the random sequence p i as the watermark as long as p i is created by applying DES (or other encryption functions).
Finally, there is a concern that ALGORITHM 1 may be subject to the multiple-document attack: the AC coe cients which were dropped in one watermarked version may appear in other versions which were created by applying di erent keys; the AC coe cients which were modi ed in one watermarked version might be untouched in other versions. Therefore it is possible for the attacker to guess the original value of the AC coe cients if there are enough versions available. One way to solve this problem is to use a master key to preprocess the original video clip (image) by applying the proposed watermarking algorithm and then always use this preprocessed version as the \original". In doing so, the original information, which was changed by the preprocessing, will never be exposed.
e Currently, Double-DES or Triple-DES which uses two or three di erent keys can be considered as safe. Through out this paper, DES means either Double-DES or Triple-DES which uses two or three di erent keys.
Raw-Image-Based Non-Invertible Watermarking Scheme
By applying the similar idea discussed in Section 4.1, we can give a modi ed version of the scheme described by Cox 
In formula (12) , is a xed number, v Wi is publicly known and is also xed, therefore, the result of DES can be regularly derived from the right side of (12) . This means that (i) if we do not know the key, we can break the DES because we can easily predict the result of DES (this contradicts the fact that the result of DES should be a random number sequence.); or (ii) if we can nd the key KEY F in reasonable time, then the known-plaintext attack is successful on DES (the cipher-text is ( v Wi v Fi ?1) and the plain-text is v Fi ). However, this contradicts the fact that, so far, there is no such an attack on DES known to the researchers. Therefore, as long as DES is safe, the above scheme is non-invertible. . Again, this contradicts the fact that there is no such an attack on DES known to the researchers so far. Therefore, as long as DES is safe, the above scheme is non-invertible. 2 5 USAGE OF DIFFERENT NON-INVERTIBLE SCHEMES DEFINITION 1 and 2 limit the non-invertibility to a single watermarking scheme, i.e., we assume that everyone uses the same watermarking scheme. However, there are many di erent watermarking schemes available. What would happen if an attacker would use a di erent watermarking scheme than the true owner?
Suppose the owner uses a watermarking scheme (E; D; C), and the attacker uses a watermarking scheme (F; D 0 ; C 0 ) where F 6 = E. Clearly, if the attacker uses an invertible scheme, then he/she can easily achieve F(V F ; W F ) = V W . Therefore, we have to require that \a legitimate watermarking scheme must be non-invertible".
If (F; D 0 ; C 0 ) is non-invertible, then the attacker cannot claim the ownership of V W by using F because the attacker can not nd V F and W F such that F(V F ; W F ) = V W . However, we notice that F(V; W) 6 = V W also holds. This means that if the true owner applies F to his/her true original V and his true watermark W, he/she can not get V W either. The veri cation process will deny the ownership to the true owner based on the fact F(V; W) 6 = V W and based on DEFINITION 1 or 2. This statement triggers several questions: Should we disprove the ownership of the true owner based on F(V; W) 6 = V W ? Do we need to modify the veri cation procedure discussed in previous section in order to allow using di erent watermarking schemes?
The answer is NO. The reason is that there is only one computationally feasible way to get V W , that is by E(V; W) = V W and by knowing the key KEY . Therefore, it is su cient that the veri cation procedure only veri es E(V; W) = V W in order to grant the ownership. We conclude our discussion with the following theorem: THEOREM 4 Given any two di erent non-invertible watermarking schemes E and F, let us assume that the true owner A uses E and the attacker B uses F. Then we can grant the ownership to A unambiguously if and only if we can verify that E(V; W) = V W .
PROOF:
The necessity is obviously true, i.e., if A is the true owner, then E(V; W) = V W . Let us prove the su ciency.
There are 4 cases which need to be veri ed:
Equation (17) is ALWAYS false because E is non-invertible. Equation (18) is ALWAYS false because E 6 = F. Equation (19) is ALWAYS false because F is non-invertible.
Therefore, we only need to con rm whether Equation (16) is true or not. If Equation (16) is true, then A is the true owner. 2 THEOREM 4 ensures that a real owner can be recognized and the ownership claim can be unambiguously resolved. 
CUSTOMER'S RIGHT PROBLEM
All existing watermarking schemes are designed to protect the original owner's copyright rather than the customer's right. There is an implicit assumption, shared by all schemes, that the owners (or the holders of the originals) themselves are always trustworthy. However, this is not always true. Because of the above implicit assumption, all the watermarking schemes are bias and unfair to legitimate customers. Legitimate customers are those who have the right to access the watermarked information through legal ways such as purchasing, signing agreement, etc.
We will give examples to show that these problems exist. Notice that, the bias not only is unfair to the customers but also causes chaos and eventually defeats the purpose of using watermarks to protect the owner's copyright. The reason will be clari ed in the following examples. One may argue that such mistakes can be easily avoided and no owner would intentionally make such mistakes. Let us look at another example. EXAMPLE 3 Owner O hires Agent A to distribute image V for O. Legally, A should give di erent customers B1, B2, ..., B99, and C di erent watermarked image V W B 1 ; V W B 2 :::; V W B 99 , and V W C , respectively, and give O royalties on the per-copy bases. However, A could illegally sell the same version watermarked using C's watermark W C to C and to B1, B2, ... B99 and then claim that he/she only sold one copy to C. C would be blamed for other 99 copies because these copies have only C' watermark on (We can assume that some or all of B i 's may not be trusted.). Clearly, C is a victim in this case. How can C protect his right, and prove his innocence? 2 EXAMPLE 4 Currently, the use of watermarked multimedia data is limited, especially in the Internet environment. Even if C purchases the right of V from O and gets V Wc which is unique and speci cally designed for C, C can not use V Wc publicly such as putting the image on C's web page. If C does so, he would lose the control of V Wc and his right on V Wc because other people can download V Wc from C for free. If B downloads V Wc and starts to sell it illegally, C will be wrongfully accused instead of B because V Wc has only C's identity on it and C has no way to prove his innocence. Would C be able to use V Wc publicly and at the same time prevent others' illegal use? 2
In the above examples, it is di cult to decide during the veri cation process whether, the owner, agent, or customers acted illegally. Current watermarking schemes, locally and completely controlled by the owner or the creator of the watermark, cannot guarantee copyright protection of customers/buyers, therefore do not provide a solution to the customer's right problem. Furthermore, the owner's copyright would not be protected because the owner would not be able to identify the illegal party (although the ownership can be decided).
In summary, we should not by default trust the owner or creator of the watermarked data. A copyright protection scheme, using and exchanging watermarked data, should be fair to all the legal transaction participants and protect both true owner's and legitimate customer's rights. Therefore, we need new protocols which involve both the owner and the customers to accompany the existing watermarking services.
CUSTOMER'S RIGHT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS
The basic idea behind our protocols is to provide a unique identi cation information for each customer and embed it in the watermark. The obvious requirement is that the owner should not be able to get the keys which are used to create these identi cation information. Otherwise, it is equivalent to the existing (local) watermarking schemes. There are two possible ways to do this. One way is to use a trusted third party (TTP), in which the TTP will handle (1) watermarking processes for all owners and customers and (2) watermark veri cation process. The other way is to design a protocol to handle watermarking processes between the owner and the customers. TTP will be used only in watermark veri cation process.
Notation
We will adopt, as much as possible, the common notation in the literature. In this paper, O and A are the owners (senders, sellers) where A could also serve as an agent. B, B i , and C are customers (receivers, buyers). TTP is a trusted third party, we also use S to represent TTP. KeyA; KeyC are private keys known only by A, C, respectively. KeyOC is a private key known only by O and is generated speci cally for C. KSA, KSC, and KSO are private keys between TTP (S) and A, C, and O, respectively. KA is a key and KA ?1 is its inverse. In symmetric cryptosystems KA = KA ?1 . In asymmetric cryptosystems, we tend to use KA as the public key and KA ?1 as the secret key of the pair (KA; KA ?1 ). fMg K means that message M is encrypted with key K. If K is a secret key, fMg K also means that M is signed by K. Notice that, we use terminology \private key" in symmetric cryptosystems and \secret key" in asymmetric cryptosystems. \P : J" means that a participant P performs a computation job J. \A |> C : M" means that A sends a message M to C. V is the original multimedia data, V W is the watermarked version. C 0 and C 1 are seeds to create watermark. The size of C 0 and C 1 are the same as the original V , i.e., each bit of C 0 and C 1 corresponds to one pixel of V .
TTP Watermarking Protocol
TTP Watermarking Protocol uses a Trusted Third Party in the middle between the owner O and the customer C. O and C do not talk to each other directly. If O wants to send a watermarked data V W to C, O sends the original V to TTP. TTP then creates V W for C using a non-invertible watermarking scheme, makes sure that the watermark used is unique for C, and sends V W to C. Here, we assume that all information from O to TTP and from TTP to C are transmitted through a secure channel. We also assume that all necessary setup steps such as authentications, key distributions, and link setup are done properly in advance. TTP could perform the watermarking process (including the veri cation) solely or could be combined together with the security service server such as the key server. The TTP Watermarking Protocol has the following steps:
Step 1. O |> S: fV g KSO Step 2. S: V W = DES KeyOC (V ) V
Step 3. S |> C:
The advantages of the TTP Watermarking Protocol are: (1) the problems we discussed in Section 6 can be avoided. TTP can make sure that each distributed copy has unique watermark in it. To verify whether a user a legal customer or not, TTP simply searches the records kept by TTP. If there is a record that matches user's name (user's name must be authenticated), then he/she is a legal user, otherwise, he/she is an illegal user. (2) it can provide standardized schemes for users. This is very important in order to achieve the non-invertibility in watermarking services.
The disadvantages of TTP Watermarking Protocol are: (1) TTP does too much work hence it can become a performance bottleneck. (2) TTP has all originals. This means that if TTP is compromised, not only the customer's right can not be protected but also all the originals are exposed. (3) TTP has to do book-keeping for all originals and evidence for all users. Therefore the size of TTP's data base will be too large. (4) Other common problems shared by all centralized schemes can occur. For example, if TTP is not available, then no one can deliver the watermarked data.
Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol
Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol allows individuals to use watermarking services and exchange data among themselves. TTP is still needed but its role is reduced to veri cation purposes. In order to get a unique watermarked version, C needs to provide its own evidence of identi cation to A to create the watermark. A then uses C's information to create the watermark, and applies a non-invertible watermarking scheme. The problem is that A can see the information provided by C therefore A could modify, destroy, or replace C's identi cation information.
One way to solve this problem is to have C apply a standard encryption function such as DES to some seed information C 0 using secret key KeyC, and give the encrypted message to A as the base for creating the watermark. The Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol has the following steps:
Step 1. C: C 1 = DES KeyC (C 0 )
Step 2. C |> A: ffC 1 g KC ?1 g KA
Step 3. A: V W = DES KeyA (C 1 ) V
Step 4. A |> C: fffV W g C 1 g KA ?1; fKeyA; V; C 1 g KSA g KC
Protocol Discussion
Now let us discuss each step of the Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol in detail.
(1) C uses DES to create its own identi cation certi cate C 1 which is a random bit sequence. Without knowing KeyC, no one can create the same certi cate C 1 (not even a certi cate similar to C 1 . This is guaranteed by the randomness of the results created by DES). The size of C 0 should be the same as the size of image V which will be watermarked, i.e., each bit of C 0 corresponds to one pixel of the image. This comes from the way we design our non-invertible schemes in Section 4. Notice that, although there are many ways to select C 0 , C 0 should not be an arbitrary sequence. If C 0 could be anything, then B could choose any K b0 , compute B 0 = DES ?1 K b0 (C 1 ), and destroy the uniqueness of C 1 's creation because C 1 also satis es C 1 = DES K b0 (B 0 ). The choice of C 0 could be some publicly known number sequence such as the rst n digits of . The choice of C 0 should be mutually agreed between A and C in setup phases. The actual size of V is also exchanged in setup phases. Key KeyC will not be sent to anyone (including TTP) and is known only to C except when veri cation is needed.
(2) C signs its evidence with the secret key KC ?1 and then encrypts it using A's public key KA and sends it to A. How to make Step 2 secure is not the focus here. There are many schemes and protocols 20, 1, 4] which can successfully handle this. Some auxiliary information may also be needed such as the requested image identi cation. Notice that we assume that all necessary authentication and key distribution steps have been done in advance.
(3) A uses C 1 as the base to generate a watermark for C, applies a non-invertible watermark scheme to the original V , and creates the watermarked image V W . KeyA is also known only to A and will not be sent to anyone including TTP, except when the veri cation is needed. The use of non-invertible scheme is for A's copyright protection not for C' right protection.
(4) A sends ffV W g C 1 g KA ?1 to C. By encrypting V W using C 1 , (i) A vows that A indeed created the watermark using C 1 , and (ii) C vows that C knows C 1 , and can therefore get V W . (i) is important because otherwise A could use, in Step 3, C 0 1 which C does not know. Then C could not prove that C has right on V W . This could be viewed as binding the information C 1 with V W . The reason we can use C 1 to encrypt V W is because C 1 is a random bit sequence created by DES and known only by A and C. Simple XOR operation of C 1 with V W is su cient for this purpose. (ii) is important because otherwise C could claim that C did not provide C 1 to A (This can also be avoided with a careful design in Step 2. For example, C binds C 1 with the identi cation of V but A needs to keep the binding information. Because (ii) can solve this problem, we do not need the binding in previous steps.). The second part of the message, i.e. fKeyA; V; C 1 g KSA , is optional and is used for the veri cation purpose only. KSA is the key known by A and TTP. KeyA and the original V won't be exposed until the veri cation is needed. The same information (i.e., fKeyA; V; C 1 g KSA ) can be provided by A when the veri cation is needed if we do not include this part in the protocol.
Veri cation Procedure
There are two issues involved in the veri cation procedure. One issue is that C needs to verify whether or not V W is actually created by using the Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol. C needs this veri cation to be sure that C has the proper right to own V W . However, C does not have to verify this immediately. Another issue is to decide who is the legitimate customer when someone other than C has the same V W . The veri cation procedure must be processed using the TTP.
For the veri cation purpose, C sends all evidence to TTP, i.e., C |> TTP: fffV W g C 1 g KA ?1; fKeyA; V; C 1 g KSA ; KeyC; C 0 g KSC Notice that C 0 is known by both A and C.
To verify if V W is created according to the Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol, TTP veri es the formula used in Step 3.
To verify if C is the legal customer of V W , TTP veri es that (1) C 0 is the seed information agreed upon between A and C and (2) C 1 = DES KeyC (C 0 ). Clearly, if B holds V W for whatever reason, but does not know KeyC, then it is computationally impossible for B to choose KeyB such that C 1 = DES KeyB (C 0 ). In this way, the uniqueness of C' right will be established.
FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE PROTOCOLS

The Role of TTP
Both the TTP Watermarking Protocol and the Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol need a trusted third party. TTP acts as the judge and performs the veri cation in both cases. The di erence is that in the Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol, TTP's role is reduced and the actual watermarking process is done at the owner/agent side. With the Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol, TTP does not have to keep all information, once the veri cation process is nished, TTP can delete those data. TTP can also acts as the authentication and key server. Otherwise, we need a separate server to handle these functions.
Auxiliary Steps and Messages
Just like any secure network protocols, the procedures of the key distribution and authentication are needed before the actual information exchanges between owner A and customer C. There exists an extensive related work as described in Section 2.2. We assume that all necessary authentication and key distribution protocols are performed properly in advance. The details of these protocols are beyond the scope of this paper.
Extra messages are needed. For example, the party's name should be included in the messages, and nonce identi ers which can provide the proof of a message's freshness are also useful. In order to emphasize the new aspects of our protocols, we have not put these details in our protocols.
There are other concerns when the protocols are actually implemented. For example, the nonrepudiation protocols should be considered in order to validate irrefutable evidence regarding the transmitted messages between participants. This is particularly important if selling and buying activities are involved.
Solutions to Our Examples
With the TTP Watermarking Protocol, the problems presented in EXAMPLE 2, 3, and 4 can be solved easily. TTP simply checks whether a user has a purchasing record in TTP's database or not. If there is a record, then the user is a legal customer, otherwise, he/she is not.
Let us check how the problems presented in EXAMPLE 2, 3, and 4 can be solved with the Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol.
The problems in EXAMPLE 2 and 3 can be solved because, with the Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol, all legal customers hold their own evidence to prove the customer's right. Neither the owner/agent nor other users know the the evidence. Thus no one other that the legal customers can prove their own rights. This prevents the illegal distribution and the distribution of the same version by mistakes.
The problem in EXAMPLE 4 can also be solved. Using the Owner-Customer Watermarking Protocol, C has the freedom to publicly use V Wc . B can still download V Wc from C, but B can no longer sell it. Buyer of B could verify if B has the proper right by asking B to prove it to the judge (TTP). B can not even use the free downloaded V Wc publicly, because B can not provide necessary evidence to prove his customer's right.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented various solutions to the copyright problem which arises for the owner of a video/image as well as for the customer/buyer of a video/image. The owner of a video/image must protect its ownership right and must be able to prove its rightful ownership in case of a veri cation request during a legal process. The customer/buyer must protect its own rights and must be able to prove that he/she purchased it from the owner of the video/image in case of a veri cation request during a legal process.
For the rightful ownership problem, we presented a novel watermarking scheme as our solution. It includes a watermark generation algorithm, using an encryption function in the construction of the watermark, as well as a watermarking insertion algorithm. We applied this watermarking scheme to MPEG-compressed video streams and achieved (1) perceptual invisibility and robustness, and (2) resolving rightful ownership. We proved that our scheme is non-invertible. We also extended our scheme to other types of media such as the uncompressed image/video.
For the protection of customer/buyer's right, we presented two protocols. Both protocols incorporate the basic idea that when a video/image information is watermarked for the customer/buyer, the customer's unique identi cation is encoded in the watermark and the key to create the identication is not known to the owner of the original video/image. This approach ensures that only the legal customer can prove that he/she purchased the video/image by showing his/her certi cate. As a result, the customer has full freedom to use his/her legal copy. In both protocols we rely strongly on a trusted third party in case of a veri cation request during a legal process.
In summary, our novel watermarking services and protocols provide a robust solution for the copyright problem of owners, and customers/buyers of digital video/image information. In addition to our technical solutions, standardization and legislative procedures for watermarking and its veri cation process are important for solving the global copyright protection problems. The standardization organization and the legislative bodies will need to limit the choices of encryption functions within the well-known standards such as DES, IDEA 19], RC4; and the choices of eligible watermarking procedures within non-invertible schemes in order to enforce the copyright control and prevent, avoid, and detect illegal transactions of copyrighted multimedia data.
